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COVID-19 Pandemic Business Safety Act: Amend Title 51 of the 
Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Torts, so as to 
Provide for Certain Immunities from Liability Claims Regarding 
COVID-19 & Executive Order by the Governor Designating 
Auxiliary Management Workers and Emergency Management 
Activities 
CODE SECTIONS: O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-1; 38-3-51; 51-16-1, 
-2, -3, -4, -5 (new) 
BILL NUMBER:  SB 359 
ACT NUMBER:  588 
GEORGIA LAWS:  2020 Ga. Laws 798 
EXECUTIVE ORDER: Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01 
EFFECTIVE DATES: Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01, April 
14, 2020; O.C.G.A. §§ 51-16-1 to -5, 
August 5, 2020 
SUMMARY:  The Executive Order expanded 
immunity from liability for volunteer 
health care workers as emergency 
management workers performing 
emergency management activities. The 
Order was not limited to only 
COVID-19-related activities. When the 
legislature reconvened, legislators 
passed the Georgia COVID-19 
Pandemic Business Safety Act, which 
provided liability limitation to 
businesses against tort claims arising 
from the pandemic. 
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Introduction 
The Origins of the Executive Order 
A newly discovered coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, caused a global 
pandemic among humans called COVID-19.1 COVID-19 is just one 
of many different types of coronaviruses.2 COVID-19 causes 
respiratory illness and is highly contagious.3 Symptoms of 
COVID-19 include fever, shortness of breath, cough, aches, sore 
throat, unexplained loss of taste or smell, diarrhea, and headache.4 
Currently, there are no treatments or vaccines available for 
COVID-19.5 COVID-19 can be spread by coming into close contact 
with those infected with the virus, by coming into contact with 
respiratory droplets of someone who is infected with the virus, and 
also by touching surfaces that the virus has been on and then 
touching your nose, eyes, or mouth without proper sanitation.6 
As of October 10, 2020, more than 37 million people across the 
globe had tested positive for COVID-19.7 COVID-19 had spread to 
over 235 countries and had killed more than 1 million people.8 
COVID-19 was first detected in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, 
when the World Health Organization (WHO) informed the public 
that Chinese health officials reported dozens of patients were being 
treated for pneumonia from an unknown source.9 On January 11, 
 
 1. Lauren M. Sauer, What Is Coronavirus?, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus [https://perma.cc/8WEG-
6AV2] (Aug. 7, 2020). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Coronavirus, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], https://www.who.int/health-
topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1 [https://perma.cc/3W7T-659A]. 
 4. Sauer, supra note 1. 
 5. Coronavirus, supra note 3. 
 6. What You Should Know About COVID-19 to Protect Yourself and Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 1, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/downloads/2019-ncov-factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR83-JR3E]. 
 7. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019 [https://perma.cc/4JTN-PWPX]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Erin Schumaker, Timeline: How Coronavirus Got Started, ABC NEWS, 
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-coronavirus-started/story?id=69435165 
[https://perma.cc/2D2F-6VKZ] (July 28, 2020, 12:12 PM). 
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2020, China reported its first death due to the new virus.10 Shortly 
after, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) started 
to conduct airport screenings at select locations for people traveling 
into the United States from China, and on January 21, 2020, the first 
case of COVID-19 was confirmed in the United States.11 
On January 30, 2020, the United States reported its first 
person-to-person transmission of COVID-19.12 The next day, 
President Donald Trump (R) declared the COVID-19 outbreak to be 
a public health emergency in the United States.13 On March 1, 2020, 
the United States reported six cases of the virus, and by April 1, 
2020, more than 27,000 people were reported to be infected with 
COVID-19.14 As of October 10, 2020, over 7.6 million COVID-19 
cases had been reported in the United States, with more than 213,000 
deaths.15 
The State of Georgia reported its first COVID-19 case on March 2, 
2020, and soon after reported its first death due to COVID-19 on 
March 12.16 Georgia, as of October 10, 2020, had confirmed more 
than 330,000 cases; 7,393 deaths; almost 30,000 hospitalizations; and 
over 5,500 Intensive Care Unit (ICU) admissions of COVID-19.17 
Hospitals in Georgia had to manage the quick increase of COVID-19 
patients, and all hospitals, especially those in rural areas, met 
challenges along the way that exhausted their resources.18 For 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Grace Hauck et al., Five Months in: A Timeline of How COVID-19 Has Unfolded in the US, 
USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/nation/2020/04/21/coronavirus-updates-how-
covid-19-unfolded-u-s-timeline/2990956001/ [https://perma.cc/AY4A-E2J5] (June 23, 2020, 6:21 AM). 
 12. Id. 
 13. David Jackson, Trump Administration Declares Coronavirus Emergency, Orders First 
Quarantine in 50 Years, USA TODAY, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/31/coronavirus-donald-trump-declares-public-
health-emergency/4625299002/ [https://perma.cc/6UZ3-WNCF] (Feb. 1, 2020, 7:17 AM). 
 14. Cases in the U.S. of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html 
[https://perma.cc/QRA2-5JMZ] (August 9, 2020). 
 15. United States COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State of CDC COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-
in-us.html [https://perma.cc/6XPG-8AMD]. 
 16. Georgia Overall COVID-19 Status, GA. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, https://dph.georgia.gov/covid-
19-daily-status-report [https://perma.cc/A79J-D7L7]. 
 17. Georgia Department of Public Health Daily Status Report, GA. DEP’T OF PUB. 
HEALTH, https://dph.georgia.gov/covid-19-daily-status-report [https://perma.cc/8PGE-XN83]. 
 18. Nyamekye Daniel, Rural Hospitals in Georgia Face Bigger Challenges in COVID-19 Response, 
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example, Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Georgia, ran 
through six months’ worth of supplies in less than a week when it 
had its first influx of patients come into the hospital.19 
The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Lieutenant 
Governor suspended the state legislature on March 13, and the 
legislature would not reconvene until mid-June.20 Because the 
legislature suspended the session, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp (R) 
was empowered to issue Executive Orders to handle the crisis 
statewide.21 Governor Kemp declared a Public Health State of 
Emergency on March 14 and subsequently issued additional 
Executive Orders to contain the spread of COVID-19.22 On April 14, 
Governor Kemp issued the controversial Executive Order 
04.14.20.01, Designation of Auxiliary Emergency Management 
Workers and Emergency Management Activities.23 
 
CTR. SQUARE (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.thecentersquare.com/georgia/rural-hospitals-in-georgia-
face-bigger-challenges-in-covid-19-response/article_d1c36b02-696b-11ea-b5fd-97a73331a234.html 
[https://perma.cc/5DU7-PLTX]. 
 19. Rebecca Klar, Hospital CEO: $7 Being Charged for 58-Cent Masks, THE HILL (Mar. 19, 2020, 
10:14 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/488408-hospital-ceo-7-being-charged-for-58-cent-
masks [https://perma.cc/N6QJ-GTSP]. 
 20. Amanda C. Coyne & Maya. T. Prabhu, Georgia Legislature Suspending Session Indefinitely 
Amid Coronavirus, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-
govt—politics/georgia-leaders-suspend-legislative-session-amid-
coronavirus/ADuMnJWxEfYvl9YDvFxfTN/ [https://perma.cc/D96E-3SCC]; Letter from Geoff 
Duncan, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and David Ralston, Lieutenant Governor, to 
Members of the Georgia Gen. Assemb. (Mar. 13, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law 
Review) (suspending the legislative session indefinitely); Letter from Geoff Duncan, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and David Ralston, Lieutenant Governor, to Members of the Georgia Gen. 
Assemb. (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review) (announcing that the 
legislative session would resume in June). 
 21. Greg Bluestein & Maya T. Prabhu, Georgia Lawmakers Grant Kemp Vast New Powers to 
Combat Coronavirus, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/georgia-
lawmakers-poised-give-kemp-new-powers-combat-coronavirus/IBjcf2rXIGecEI1SpFhesK/ 
[https://perma.cc/6FPV-T3HB]. 
 22. Greg Bluestein, Kemp Declares Public Health Emergency; 66 Coronavirus Cases in Ga., 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/kemp-
declares-unprecedented-public-health-emergency-georgia/gdTeQfD6zJPb1kbYlRLHRO/ 
[https://perma.cc/W992-XE87]; Greg Bluestein, Kemp Orders Public K-12 Schools, Colleges in 
Georgia Closed Through End of March, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/kemp-orders-all-public-schools-georgia-
closed-through-end-march/Alpzcxpd6xN8f2TGySOyzM/ [https://perma.cc/2SCZ-T2A3]. 
 23. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01 (Apr. 14, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law 
Review). 
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In the event of a Public Health State of Emergency, under Code 
section 38-3-51 the “Governor may declare that a state of emergency 
or disaster exists.”24 Under a state of emergency, many new powers 
vest in the Governor to execute proper actions and precautions to 
protect the health and safety of Georgia citizens; the powers under 
Code section 35-3-51(c) exist for the period of the state of 
emergency.25 The Governor may “perform and exercise such other 
functions, powers, and duties as may be deemed necessary to 
promote and secure the safety and protection of the civilian 
population.”26 In addition, the Governor may “[s]uspend any 
regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state 
business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency, if 
strict compliance with any statute, order, rule, or regulation would in 
any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the 
emergency or disaster.”27 
Faced with a flood of volunteer and retired healthcare 
professionals, and in light of the necessary flexibility during the 
COVID-19 surge, healthcare institutions and facilities needed critical 
assistance and care from the State of Georgia during this 
unprecedented emergency.28 Code section 38-3-35 provides 
immunity from liability of agencies and emergency management 
workers.29 Under Code section 38-3-35(a), “[n]either the state 
nor . . . the agents . . . of the state . . . shall be liable for personal 
injury or property damage sustained by . . . a volunteer emergency 
management worker or member of any agency engaged in emergency 
management activity.”30 Except in cases of “willful misconduct, 
gross negligence, or bad faith,” the Code section exempts from 
liability for injury or death both “employees, agents, or 
representatives of the state” and “volunteer[s] or auxiliary emergency 
management worker[s] or member[s] of any agency engaged in any 
 
 24. O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51 (2012 & Supp. 2020). 
 25. § 38-3-51(c). 
 26. § 38-3-51(c)(4). 
 27. § 38-3-51(d)(1). 
 28. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01, supra note 23. 
 29. O.C.G.A. § 38-3-35 (2012 & Supp. 2020). 
 30. § 38-3-35(a). 
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emergency management activity complying with or reasonably 
attempting to comply” with the statutory requirements.31 
The Executive Order deemed employees, staff, and contractors of 
healthcare institutions and medical facilities auxiliary emergency 
management workers where services were provided or performed 
during the Public Health State of Emergency.32 The Order further 
deemed the services provided or performed by healthcare institutions 
and medical facilities constituted emergency management 
activities.33 
Get-Out-of-Jail-Free-Card 
In the midst of a crisis not seen since 1918, Congress passed the 
Coronavirus, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, which 
President Trump signed into law on March 27, 2020.34 A provision of 
the Act, section 3215, provided healthcare professionals with a form 
of relief from potential legal liability from medical malpractice 
claims.35 This provision only applies to volunteer health care 
professionals, however.36 The medical community answered the call 
from governors across the United States in response to the 
COVID-19 outbreak: “There is . . . no medicine to provide a simple 
cure. There are not enough tests. There is not enough personal 
protective equipment for medical personnel. There are not enough 
ventilators, hospital beds, and staff to handle the mounting crisis.”37 
In light of the crisis, field hospitals popped up across the nation; the 
President deployed the Naval hospital ship, the USNS Comfort; and 
elective surgeries and procedures were postponed to increase the 
 
 31. § 38-3-35(b) (emphasis added). 
 32. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01, supra note 23, at 2. The Order referenced the Georgia Code to 
provide more detailed definitions of specific terms applicable to the scope of the Order. See O.C.G.A. 
§ 31-7-1(4)(A), (4)(C)–(G), (5) (2019 & Supp. 2020). 
 33. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01, supra note 23, at 2. 
 34. 15 U.S.C.A. § 9001. 
 35. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 3215, 134 Stat. 
281, 374 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001–80). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Peter Kolbert & Caryn Lilling, New York Leads the Way In Providing Liability Protections to 
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number of available beds for COVID-19 victims.38 Georgia, 
specifically, set up a “200-bed temporary hospital in an Atlanta 
convention center and, with the help of FEMA, dispatched four 
mobile units of about [twenty-two] beds each to different corners of 
the state.”39 
Following the lead of other states and Congress, in an effort to 
provide healthcare facilities additional flexibility, Governor Kemp 
issued Executive Order 04.14.20.01 to protect healthcare workers 
fighting on the front lines against COVID-19.40 The Order attempted 
to encourage health-trained individuals to join the fight against 
COVID-19 by reducing legal exposure for regular providers and 
authorized healthcare personnel.41 
Critics argue that the Order is a backdoor to a failed tort reform 
effort.42 Governor Kemp reassures that this is not the case: 
As healthcare facilities battle COVID-19 in communities 
across Georgia, they face incredible challenges. Healthcare 
workers are making personal sacrifices to provide critical 
care to patients in need and save lives. These Georgians—
some coming out of retirement or reentering the workforce 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Liz Essley Whyte, As Georgia Lifts Restrictions, Its Hospitals May Be Unready for a COVID-19 
Surge, NPR (May 12, 2020, 2:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2020/05/12/854671686/as-georgia-lifts-restrictions-its-hospitals-are-not-ready-for-a-covid-19-
surge [https://perma.cc/HZ4U-SXZC]. 
 40. Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, Georgia Order Limits Liability of Healthcare Institution Staff 
During COVID-19 State of Emergency, JD SUPRA (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/georgia-order-limits-liability-of-29703/ [https://perma.cc/EEZ4-
C4RS]. 
 41. Press Release, Brian P. Kemp, Gov. of Georgia, Gov. Kemp Issues New Executive Orders, 
Provides COVID-19 Update (Mar. 23, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2020-03-23/gov-
kemp-issues-new-executive-orders-provides-covid-19-update [https://perma.cc/5KPA-HFQG]. 
 42. Chris Joyner & Sarah Kallis, Gov. Kemp Limits Legal Liability of Hospitals, Staff During 
Pandemic, GA. WATCH (Apr. 17, 2020), https://georgiawatch.org/gov-kemp-limits-legal-liability-of-
hospitals-staff-during-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/MT3W-49CJ] (“The Georgia medical industry 
consistently pushes state lawmakers to put new limits on patient lawsuits. This year, a push to massively 
reform the system died when enough Republican lawmakers joined with Democrats to quash it in the 
State Senate.”). Additionally, the focus should be on supporting healthcare workers confronting the 
COVID-19 pandemic and should not be used as a backdoor to circumvent that debate. Id. (quoting 
Georgia Watch Executive Director Liz Coyle). 
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just to lend a helping hand—are true heroes among us. I’m 
proud to support them.43 
However, critics think the Order is too broad because it covers all 
types of malpractice and are concerned that institutions will “claim 
immunity for existing deficiencies in care that are unrelated to the 
pandemic.”44 Proponents of the Order, including the Georgia Health 
Care Association (GHCA), feel the crisis forces the industry to adopt 
a new standard of care, which the Order articulates clearly.45 
Analysis 
The following section analyzes Executive Order 04.14.20.01, 
Designation of Auxiliary Emergency Management Workers and 
Emergency Management Activities.46 
Unintended Consequences 
Georgia followed suit of other states when Governor Brian Kemp 
(R) issued Executive Order 04.14.20.01 to protect healthcare workers 
fighting on the front line against COVID-19.47 Though the Order 
limits legal exposure for regular providers, authorized healthcare 
personnel, and healthcare volunteers, the Order does not limit legal 
immunity to issues related to COVID-19.48 Notably, however, the 
Order extends protections for all “services provided or performed” by 
healthcare institutions and medical facilities during the Public Health 
State of Emergency.49 Some critics argue that the Order is so broad 
 
 43. Id. (quoting Governor Kemp). 
 44. Id. Bill Holbert, an Atlanta attorney, expressed concern about the legality of the orders, calling 
them a “get-out-of-jail-free card” that essentially provides the institutions with “blanket immunity for 
services they are already being paid for.” Id. (quoting Bill Holbert). 
 45. Id. (quoting GHCA President Tony Marshall). Tony Marshall observed that the Order 
“effectively recognizes that the normal standards of care have to be deviated from in this crisis.” Id. 
(“Without that you would automatically lose every lawsuit.”). 
 46. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01, supra note 23. 
 47. Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, supra note 40. 
 48. Id.; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01, supra note 23, at 2. 
 49. Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, supra note 40. 
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that it will cover all types of malpractice.50 This issue could cause 
possible oversights in industries like nursing homes that have a 
“troubling track record” if legal immunity is not limited to 
COVID-19-related issues.51 
Other states have avoided similar pushback. “New York, New 
Jersey and Illinois have passed similar immunity measures, but they 
are generally tailored for medical care explicitly related to the 
pandemic.”52 The Illinois Executive Order provided that healthcare 
facilities, professionals, and volunteers who provided services in 
response to the COVID-19 outbreak maintain immunity from civil 
liability.53 This provision differs from Georgia’s Executive Order, 
which limited civil liability exposure for employees, staff, and 
contractors of healthcare institutions and medical facilities for 
services provided during the Public Health State of Emergency. 
Thus, the Illinois Executive Order ensures that industries already 
under a watchful regulatory eye will remain so when providing 
services unrelated to the COVID-19 pandemic and will not escape 
their responsibilities with a blanket get-out-of-jail-free card in 
disguise of an Executive Order. 
New York’s Executive Order provided that medical professionals 
“shall be immune from civil liability for any injury or death alleged 
to have been sustained directly as a result of an act or omission by 
such medical professional in the course of providing medical services 
in support of the State’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak . . . .”54 
 
 50. Joyner & Kallis, supra note 42. 
 51. Id.; Suzy Khimm et al., More than 2,200 Coronavirus Deaths in Nursing Homes, but Federal 
Government Isn’t Tracking Them, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2020, 4:07 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/more-2-200-coronavirus-deaths-nursing-homes-federal-
government-isn-n1181026 [https://perma.cc/5VG9-ZSZX]. 
 52. Joyner & Kallis, supra note 42; N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.01 (Mar. 7, 2020) (on file with the 
Georgia State University Law Review); Conn. Exec. Order No. 7U (Mar. 10, 2020) (on file with the 
Georgia State University Law Review); Ill. Exec. Order No. 17 (Mar. 28, 2020) (on file with the 
Georgia State University Law Review); N.C. Exec. Order No. 130 (Apr. 8, 2020) (on file with the 
Georgia State University Law Review); Interview with Michael Prieto, Partner, Prieto Marigliano 
Holbert Prieto, LLC (May 29, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review) 
[hereinafter Prieto Interview] (stating gross negligence is almost an impossible standard to prove, 
leaving a plaintiff’s chance to recover from a claim that arose during the time covered by the Executive 
Order almost impossible). 
 53. Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, supra note 40 (emphasis added); Ill. Exec. Order No. 17, supra 
note 52; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01, supra note 23, at 2. 
 54. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.01, supra note 52 (emphasis added). 
9
Velaj and Viger: TORTS: COVID-19 Pandemic Business Safety Act & Executive Order by
Published by Reading Room,
144 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1 
Another state Governor deemed it important to qualify the Executive 
Order’s limitation of liability to services provided in response to the 
pandemic. Georgia’s Order differs from New York’s Order in the 
same way that it differs from Illinois’s Order. 
North Carolina’s Executive Order went a step further by limiting 
liability for healthcare workers responding to COVID-19.55 It 
extended the statute establishing limited liability for “emergency 
management workers,” to healthcare workers “providing health care 
services to patients affected by COVID-19.”56 Again, North Carolina 
deemed it appropriate to insert “affected” to limit its 
get-out-of-jail-free card to healthcare workers, unlike Georgia. 
Georgia failed to foresee the issue arising from providing blanket 
immunity that could result in serious litigation in the future. 
Impact 
Governor Kemp’s broad expansion of an “auxiliary emergency 
management worker” includes most medical providers that citizens 
have interacted with during the Public Health State of Emergency.57 
Code section 38-3-35(b) limits the liability of auxiliary emergency 
management workers that reasonably comply with the statute, except 
in cases of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or bad faith.58 The 
Executive Order does not limit the expansion to claims that deal 
specifically with COVID-19 but instead provides a shield to any 
claim from services provided or performed by auxiliary emergency 
management workers during the Public Health State of Emergency.59 
Proponents of the Order stress that the COVID-19 crisis has 
required many in the medical industry to adopt a new standard of 
care that deviates from the established norm.60 Because of how 
drastically practices in the industry have changed, proponents argue 
that the Order is necessary.61 Critics, however, argue the exact 
 
 55. Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, supra note 40. 
 56. Id.; N.C. Exec. Order No. 130, supra note 52. 
 57. Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, supra note 40. 
 58. O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51 (2012 & Supp. 2020). 
 59. Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, supra note 40. 
 60. Joyner & Kallis, supra note 42. 
 61. Id. 
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opposite—that the Order is unnecessary because the “reasonable” 
standard of care would already apply during the Public Health State 
of Emergency.62 Critics point out that medical entities and personnel 
could have been found liable for malpractice in 
non-COVID-19-related contexts during the pandemic, but the Order 
eliminates that possibility.63 
Power to Suspend Regulatory Schemes 
Governor Kemp’s power is well-established; the Supreme Court 
has held that states maintain the power to protect the public health 
and welfare.64 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court 
granted states and their Governors broad powers to enact reasonable 
regulations to protect public health and safety.65 In Jacobson, the 
Supreme Court wrote that: 
Although this court has refrained from any attempt to 
define the limits of [the Tenth Amendment’s] power, . . . it 
has distinctly recognized the authority of a state to enact 
quarantine laws and “health laws of every description” . . . . 
According to settled principles, the police power of a state 
must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable 
regulations established directly by legislative enactment as 
will protect the public health and the public safety.66 
 
 62. Prieto Interview, supra note 52. 
 63. Interview with Bill Holbert, Partner, Prieto Marigliano Holbert Prieto, LLC (May 29, 2020) (on 
file with the Georgia State University Law Review) (“Last year, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
published an investigation detailing neglectful and unsafe conditions at personal care homes across the 
state. I fear institutions will claim immunity for existing deficiencies in care that are unrelated to the 
pandemic.”); Prieto Interview, supra note 52 (opposing the Executive Order and emphasizing the irony 
of what the Order says about Georgia’s justice system; explaining the government says it trusts juries in 
criminal cases to make a determination as to whether someone should live or die, yet it does not trust 
that same jury to make a determination as to whether a medical provider acted reasonably within the 
appropriate standard of care). 
 64. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 65. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25; Maggie Davis et al., Calling Their Own Shots: Governors’ Emergency 
Declarations During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 12 CONLAWNOW 95, 95 (2020). 
 66. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25. 
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The Court in Jacobson established that states maintain the 
authority to enact public health laws, and the Second Circuit affirmed 
this principle more than a century later.67 In Phillips v. City of New 
York, the Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s precedent in 
Jacobson to dismiss the constitutional claims of parents that opposed 
state-mandated vaccination.68 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that states maintain the authority to create laws protecting 
the health of the public.69 
Under Code section 38-3-51, Governor Kemp may “[s]uspend any 
regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state 
business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency, if 
strict compliance with any statute, order, rule, or regulation would in 
any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the 
emergency or disaster.”70 However, this power is limited in that it 
only exists for the period of the state of emergency.71 
Governor Kemp’s Actions Are Protected 
States’ and Governors’ powers have been challenged as the 
pandemic progressed, and some of these challenges have been met 
with success.72 The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently declared that 
the extended stay-at-home Order issued by the state’s Secretary of 
Health was unenforceable.73 Importantly, the court pointed out that 
the case was “not about Governor Tony Evers’s Emergency Order or 
the powers of the Governor.”74 In Wolf v. Scarnati, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court upheld Governor Tom Wolf’s (D) ability to maintain 
 
 67. Id.; Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 68. Phillips, 775 F.3d at 542 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25–27, 37–38). 
 69. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). 
 70. O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51(d)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2020). 
 71. § 38-3-51(c). 
 72. See, e.g., Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 2020) (denying 
motion for a temporary stay against Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker’s (D) Executive Order 2020-332, the 
State’s stay-at-home Order); Power v. Leon Cnty., No. 2020 CA 001200, 2020 WL 3468349 (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. 2020) (denying motion to enjoin county’s mask ordinance). But see, e.g., Bailey v. Pritzker, No. 
3:20-cv-474-GCS, 2020 WL 3498428 (S.D. Ill. 2020) (granting restraining order against Governor 
Pritzker’s 30-day extension of the State’s stay-at-home Order). 
 73. Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Wis. 2020); Davis et al., supra note 65, at 
100. 
 74. Wisconsin Legislature, 942 N.W.2d at 905. 
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COVID-19 shutdown Orders.75 After Governor Wolf renewed the 
state’s emergency disaster proclamation, the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly adopted a concurrent resolution to terminate the disaster 
emergency but did not present the resolution to the Governor.76 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the resolution was a legal 
nullity because it was not presented to the Governor for approval or 
veto and stated: “The Pennsylvania Constitution does not empower 
the legislature to act unilaterally to suspend a law, and the 
Governor’s purported suspension of law did not violate the 
non-delegation doctrine.”77 
These challenges will largely depend on the balancing test 
articulated in Jacobson, weighing the state’s interest in the public 
health emergency against the alleged intrusion on civil liberties.78 
Governor Kemp’s Executive Orders had not been challenged as of 
October 1, 2020. However, Governor Kemp did sue Atlanta Mayor 
Keisha Lance Bottoms (D) and members of the Atlanta City Council 
to invalidate and enjoin enforcement of mask mandates.79 Governor 
Kemp argued that Atlanta “may only exercise the powers delegated 
to it by the state[] and Mayor Bottoms’s attempts to exercise an 
undelegated power against the state” were beyond her legal 
authority.80 In addition, Governor Kemp claimed Georgia law 
provides the Governor with “the power to suspend municipal orders 
that are contradictory to any state law or to his executive orders.”81 
The Georgia Municipal Association (GMA) filed an amicus brief in 
opposition to the Governor, arguing that Georgia’s Constitution 
allows local governments to form their own legislation and that 
Mayor Bottoms’s mandatory mask Order does just that.82 
 
 75. Wolf v. Scarnati, 233 A.3d 679, 707 (Pa. 2020). 
 76. Id. at 685. 
 77. Id. at 707. 
 78. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905); Davis et al., supra note 65, at 100–01. 
 79. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10–15, Kemp v. Bottoms, No. 
2020CV338387, 2020 WL 4036827 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 16, 2020) [hereinafter Mask Mandate 
Complaint]. 
 80. Id.; Lawsuits About State Actions and Policies in Response to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) 
Pandemic, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA [hereinafter Lawsuits State Action], 
https://ballotpedia.org/Lawsuits_about_state_actions_and_policies_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(C
OVID-19)_pandemic,_2020 [https://perma.cc/RHV5-9BZ6]. 
 81. Mask Mandate Complaint, supra note 79, at 5; Lawsuits State Actions, supra note 80. 
 82. Jim Galloway et al., The Jolt: Governor Kemp’s Lawsuit Would Overturn Mask Requirements in 
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Governor Kemp’s powers, if challenged, would likely be protected 
under the Jacobson balancing test because they are more similar to 
those at issue in Wolf than in Wisconsin Legislature. Executive Order 
04.14.20.01 related directly to his authority to enact such Orders as 
provided in Code section 38-3-51. Thus, Governor Kemp’s authority 
to enact the Order would be the center of any lawsuit challenging the 
Order, unlike in Wisconsin Legislature where the court analyzed the 
enforceability of an extended stay-at-home Order issued by the state 
Secretary of Health rather than an Executive Order issued by the 
Governor. Governor Kemp’s powers will be protected under 
Jacobson because Georgia has a sufficient interest in protecting its 
citizens’ health with the continuing number of COVID-19 cases. In 
addition, Governor Kemp’s authority will be protected, just as 
Governor Wolf’s powers were protected in Wolf, because the Georgia 
legislature cannot unilaterally suspend a law. 
Public Policy 
Critics argue that the Order is really a backdoor effort to the failed 
tort reform act that was quashed in the State Senate earlier this year.83 
The “Georgia medical industry consistently pushes state lawmakers 
to put new limits on patient lawsuits,” and the Georgia Hospital 
Association seemed to hold the upper hand in its massive lobbying 
efforts to the Governor’s office to get the Order issued.84 Senator 
Steve Gooch (R), the bill’s lead sponsor, said the bill is necessary to 
keep jury awards and insurance premiums down so that Georgia will 
continue to be business-friendly.85 
 
100 Georgia Cities, Brief Says, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (July 22, 2020), 
https://www.ajc.com/politics/politics-blog/the-jolt-governor-kemps-lawsuit-would-overturn-mask-
requirements-in-100-georgia-cities-brief-says/RLYILTDDW5GGFDBSSTQOUKZL4I/ 
[https://perma.cc/KL23-WXJU]. The Georgia Municipal Association’s (GMA) argued that “[t]he 
Georgia General Assembly . . . intended for local governments to have the ability to enhance guidance 
from the Governor through supplementation, so long as the supplementation by the local governments is 
consistent with the Governor’s executive orders.” Id. The GMA’s brief continues: “If the goal of the 
Plaintiff’s repeated executive orders strongly encouraging the usage of masks was to increase the usage 
of such, then it is a reasonable reading that mandating usage of such would help achieve that goal.” Id. 
 83. Joyner & Kallis, supra note 42. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Bill Rankin, It’s Business and Insurers vs. Trial Lawyers in Fight over Torts Bill, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/business-and-insurers-trial-lawyers-fight-
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Sponsors said more changes were needed to “stop runaway jury 
verdicts and correctly apportion blame when someone is injured and 
sues for compensation.”86 On the other side, opponents of the bill 
“call[ed] the legislation an assault on the U.S. Constitution’s 
guarantee of a citizen’s right to a trial by jury.”87 Senator Gooch 
countered and said the “reputation of Georgia’s civil justice system 
[was] being called into question . . . [and the] system [needed to] 
change if Georgia was going to continue to be a good place to do 
business and live.”88 However, the bill was ultimately quashed. These 
same concerns can be construed as the underlying backbone to the 
pressures prompting the Governor’s signature of the Order as an 
alternative to the failed tort reform bill. 
The legislature reconvened on June 15. Late into the session, 
legislators introduced and ultimately passed Senate Bill (SB) 359, 
also known as the Georgia COVID-19 Pandemic Business Safety 
Act.89 This bill “provide[d] substantial liability limitation to 
businesses against tort claims arising from the COVID-19 
pandemic,” similar to the Order.90 The bill originated when hospital 
and healthcare providers requested immunity; legislators later 
broadened it to include sports venues and ultimately businesses.91 
The “limitation” of liability covered any healthcare provider and any 
other “entity” for any “COVID-19 liability claim.”92 The bill also 
 
over-tort-bills/fE3Z6hH3b8COrC1q9fhi4N/ [https://perma.cc/UEG5-TMM9]; Bill Rankin & Maya T. 
Prabhu, Tort Legislation Stalls in Georgia Senate, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/tort-legislation-stalls-georgia-senate/YJ2baxvlKYvAm7YEHsYv5O/ 
[https://perma.cc/4VRN-7LHW]. 
 86. Rankin, supra note 85. 
 87. Id. (quoting Georgia Association of Trial Lawyers President Dan Snipes) (“‘Georgia has a very 
fair and balanced court system,’ Snipes said. ‘This bill is a sweeping overthrow of our judiciary that 
benefits insurance companies and big business at the expense of our citizens who have been harmed by 
the negligence of others.’”). 
 88. Id. (quoting Senator Steve Gooch) (“The Washington-based American Tort Reform Association 
recently ranked Georgia sixth on its top-10 list of the nation’s ‘Judicial Hellholes.’ Georgia, its annual 
report said, is a state where ‘outrageous nuclear verdicts have become the norm.’”). 
 89. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-16-1–5 (Supp. 2020); see also Georgia Legislature Approves Liability 
Limitation in COVID-19 Pandemic Business Safety Act, NELSON MULLINS (July 7, 2020) [hereinafter 
Pandemic Business Safety Act], 
https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/alerts/gold_dome/all/georgia-legislature-approves-
liability-limitation-in-covid-19-pandemic-business-safety-act [https://perma.cc/HE97-MLYR]. 
 90. Pandemic Business Safety Act, supra note 89; see also §§ 51-16-1–5. 
 91. Pandemic Business Safety Act, supra note 89; see also §§ 51-16-1–5. 
 92. Pandemic Business Safety Act, supra note 89; see also §§ 51-16-1–5. 
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included a rebuttable presumption that a customer or patient assumes 
the risk of infection if the business makes specific efforts to warn the 
customer or patient.93 The liability limitation covered causes of 
action that accrue through July 14, 2021.94 This bill mirrored the 
same underlying concerns of both the failed tort reform act (that 
would have made make Georgia more business-friendly) and the 
Order (that provided blanket immunity).95 
Conclusion 
Georgia reported its first COVID-19 case on March 2, 2020, and 
soon after reported its first death due to COVID-19 on March 12.96 
Faced with a flood of COVID-19 patients, healthcare facilities in 
Georgia needed critical assistance and care from volunteer and 
retired healthcare professionals during this unprecedented 
emergency.97 Following the lead of other states and Congress—in an 
effort to provide healthcare facilities additional flexibility—Governor 
Brian Kemp (R) issued the Executive Order 04.14.20.01 to protect 
healthcare workers fighting on the front lines against COVID-19.98 
The Order attempted to encourage health-trained individuals to join 
the fight against COVID-19 by reducing legal exposure for regular 
providers and authorized healthcare personnel.99 
However, the Order failed to limit liability to COVID-19-related 
measures, unlike Executive Orders of other states, which could have 
great consequences in litigation in the future. Specifically, the Order 
used the term “reasonable” in relation to how healthcare volunteers 
and others work, without clearly defining the term. Critics of the 
Order also argued that it could be disguised as an attempt to institute 
the failed tort reform act. Ultimately, the Order addressed the need to 
 
 93. Pandemic Business Safety Act, supra note 89; see also §§ 51-16-1–5. 
 94. Pandemic Business Safety Act, supra note 89; see also §§ 51-16-1–5. 
 95. Patrick L. Grp., LLC, Georgia COVID-19 Pandemic Business Safety Act, JD SUPRA (July 7, 
2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/georgia-covid-19-pandemic-business-49830/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y6PD-6URY]. 
 96. Georgia Overall COVID-19 Status, supra note 16. 
 97. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01, supra note 23. 
 98. Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, supra note 40. 
 99. Press Release, supra note 41. 
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protect Georgians who answered the call to provide healthcare 
services during the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. 
Angelena Velaj & Troy Viger 
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